¿Por qué algunas empresas pagan extorsión y otras no?

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Resumen

→ Antecedentes

→ Este estudio

→ Implicaciones

Antecedentes

FOTO: GOBIERNO DE MÉXICO

La extorsión en México y América Central

→ Causa de violencia e inseguridad

→ Inestabilidad política

→ Freno al desarrollo

ORIGINAL PAPER

Are Repeatedly Extorted Businesses Different? A Multilevel Hurdle Model of Extortion Victimization

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Abstract

Objectives Research consistently shows that crime concentrates on a few repeatedly victimized places and targets. In this paper we examine whether the same is true for extortion against businesses. We then test whether the factors that explain the likelihood of becoming a victim of extortion also explain the number of incidents suffered by victimized businesses. The alternative is that extortion concentration is a function of event dependence.

Methods Drawing on Mexico's commercial victimization survey, we determine whether repeat victimization occurs by chance by comparing the observed distribution to that expected under a Poisson process. Next, we utilize a multilevel negative binomial-logit hurdle model to examine whether area- and business-level predictors of victimization are also associated with the number of repeat extortions suffered by businesses.

Results Findings suggest that extortion is highly concentrated, and that the predictors of repeated extortion differ from those that predict the likelihood of becoming a victim of extortion. While area-level variables showed a modest association with the likelihood of extortion victimization, they were not significant predictors of repeat incidents. Similarly, most business-level variables significantly associated with victimization risk showed insignificant (and sometimes contrary) associations with victimization concentration. Overall, unexplained differences in extortion concentration at the business-level were unaffected by predictors of extortion prevalence.

Conclusions The inconsistent associations of predictors across the hurdle components suggest that extortion prevalence and concentration are fueled by two distinct processes, an interpretation congruent with theoretical expectations regarding extortion that considers that repeats are likely fueled by a process of event dependence.

Keywords Repeat victimization · Hurdle model · Extortion · Organized crime · Crimes against businesses

¿Por qué algunas empresas sufren más extorsión que otras?

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En 2013, el 2% de las empresas (27% de las víctimas) sufiró el 56% de las extorsiones en México.

La victimización repetida

→ El riesgo de sufrir una extorsión no es igual para todas las empresas

→ Sufrir una extorsión puede aumentar el riesgo de sufrir otra en el futuro

→ Los factores que predicen la prevalencia, no explican la concentración

No todas las extorsiones son iguales

Determinants of extortion compliance: Empirical evidence from a victimisation survey

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Abstract

This article focuses on the situational-, victim-, and area-level determinants of extortion compliance. Extortion, a quintessential organised crime, is one of the most common crimes in Mexico. However, compliance with extortion demands is relatively rare. Previous research suggests that compliance with extortion depends on the perceived risk of punishment for non-compliance. However, most research has been theoretical or experimental. The article offers empirical evidence of patterns of extortion compliance based on data from a large commercial victimisation survey conducted in Mexico. Findings suggest that situational factors (extortion type, presence of weapons and number of offenders) are the main determinants of extortion compliance. Victim-, and area-level variables have comparatively smaller effects. Implications for research and practice are discussed.

Keywords: extortion, organised crime, decision theory, Mexico

Este estudio

→ En México, solo el 13% de las extorsiones son pagadas, ¿por qué?

  → Características del incidente

  → Características de la víctima

  → La presencia de la delincuencia organizada

¿Qué dice la literatura?

→ La decisión de pagar una extorsión es racional (riesgo vs costo)

→ El riesgo es incierto (es difícil saber si la amenaza es real)

→ Algunas víctimas son más vulnerables que otras

→ Presencia de la delincuencia organizada y la extorsión sistémica

Encuesta de victimización

→ 3369 incidentes

  → ¿Pagó lo que le pidieron?

→ Incidente

  → Remota vs presencial

  → Armas, No. de delincuentes.

→ Víctima

  → Otros delitos, tamaño, giro, edad

→ Presencia delincuencia organizada

  → Estado de derecho

  → Delitos de armas, drogas, corrupción

¿Qué característica es más importante?

8

2

2

Incidente

Víctima

Presencia
delincuencia
organizada

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
El factor más importante son las características del incidente.

Remota: 8%
Presencial: 38% - 57%

Com arma: 52% - 72%

"

Características de la víctima son menos relevantes:

Más victimizadas pagan menos; más sobornos pagan más.

Industrias pagan menos remotas.

La presencia de la delincuencia organizada no afectó la probabilidad de pago.

Pero la presencia de la DO afecta el riesgo de victimización

Implicaciones

→ La extorsión no es un problema, son por lo menos dos

→ Presencial vs Remota

→ Políticas de prevención específicas

Check for updates

Street corner decisions: an empirical investigation of extortionist choices in El Salvador

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ABSTRACT
This paper identifies offender choice patterns associated with extortion subtypes in El Salvador, Central America. Previous research attributes the rise of extortion in the country to the evolution and propagation of Los Angeles-born street gangs Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18. Data from a unique business victimisation survey is used to analyse 53 decisions in 869 reported cases. The study borrows a multidimensional scaling method used in criminal profiling research to identify offender choice patterns. Cases are classified into extortion subtypes based on identified choice groupings. Key offender choices and location features are compared across extortion subtypes. Offender choice patterns identified in the study are consistent with systemic and opportunistic extortion described in previous literature. About a third of the cases are designated as hybrid extortions due to the blend of choice structuring properties they exhibit, which combines aspects of both systemic and opportunistic extortion.

Evidencia de El Salvador

→ Extorsión sistémica, oportunista e híbrida

→ 35%, 35% y 30%

→ Diferencias en método

→ Presencial vs telefónica

Muchas gracias